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Closing the Impunity Gap in U.S. Law 
David Scheffer* 
The following article is the author’s written testimony submitted to the 
Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law, Committee on the Judiciary, 
U.S. Senate, on October 6, 2009, for a hearing entitled, “No Safe Haven: 
Accountability for Human Rights Violators, Part II.”  The author had testified 
on November 14, 2007, in a related hearing to examine why the United States 
remains a safe haven from prosecution for major human rights violators of 
foreign citizenship.  Following that hearing, Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL), 
the chairman of the subcommittee, and Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK), its 
ranking member, co-sponsored legislation, which became law, aimed at 
closing gaps in federal statutes related to the commission of certain crimes 
outside the United States.  This second submission of testimony focuses 
particularly on the Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009, introduced in July 
2009 by Senators Durbin, Patrick Leahy (D-VT), and Russ Feingold (D-WI).  
This legislation would introduce into federal law a broader set of criminal 
offenses pertaining to both U.S. citizens and aliens who visit or reside in the 
United States. 
¶1 I wish to thank Chairman Richard Durbin, the ranking member, Senator Tom 
Coburn, and the other members of the Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law of 
the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate for the opportunity to present written 
testimony in connection with the Subcommittee’s hearing on October 6, 2009, entitled 
“No Safe Haven: Accountability for Human Rights Violators: Part II.”  I teach 
international criminal law and international human rights law at Northwestern University 
School of Law, where I also direct the Center for International Human Rights.  I am a 
former U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues (1997-2001). 
¶2 When I last testified before the subcommittee, in November 2007,1 there were 
numerous gaps in U.S. federal law that prevented the prosecution of various types of 
cases pertaining to three categories of crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity (which 
include torture and, as a crime of persecution, ethnic cleansing), and war crimes (which 
also include torture).  I have long described these three major categories as “atrocity 
crimes” for ease of reference and to more accurately convey and emphasize the 
                                                 
* David Scheffer is the Mayer Brown/Robert A. Helman Professor of Law and the Director of the Center 
for International Human Rights at Northwestern University School of Law.  He is the faculty adviser of the 
Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights and previously served as the U.S. 
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues (1997-2001). 
1 No Safe Haven: Accountability for Human Rights Violations in the United States: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) 
(statement of David Scheffer, Mayer Brown/Robert A. Helman Professor of Law, Northwestern University 
School of Law, Chicago, Ill.), available at 
http://judicary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3028&wit_id=6778. 
Vol. 8:1] David Scheffer 
 31
jurisprudential development of such crimes in the international and hybrid criminal 
tribunals since 1993.2 I am reiterating in this testimony much of what I conveyed two 
years ago because, while the situation has changed (and I will note progress below), some 
of the fundamental points I raised remain and require further examination by the 
subcommittee.  There also has been a major development with the introduction of the 
Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009,3 which I examine later in this testimony. 
¶3 I will not address human rights violations that do not rise to the level of magnitude 
and criminality found in the atrocity crimes or the gaps that may exist under U.S. federal 
law with respect to other violations of international human rights law.  The latter would 
be a very extensive undertaking beyond the scope of my testimony.  There is a rich and 
continuing line of civil cases under the Alien Tort Statute of 1789 (“ATS”),4 a truly 
unique American law, dealing with various human rights violations and seeking civil 
damages only, and the Torture Victim Prevention Act of 1991 (“TVPA”),5 which again 
only permits civil damages with respect to acts of torture.  I will refrain from examining 
ATS or TVPA litigation in this testimony; here I focus exclusively on criminal law and 
military law and how to ensure that U.S. law sufficiently empowers U.S. courts with 
appropriate jurisdiction to investigate and judge the culpability of alleged perpetrators of 
atrocity crimes. 
I. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
(1) The United States must eliminate any possibility that it would remain a 
safe haven for war criminals and other perpetrators of atrocities who reach 
American shores and seek to avoid accountability for atrocity crimes.  The 
United States must further demonstrate its willingness to hold its own citizens 
accountable for atrocity crimes as a commitment to the rule of law and to 
America’s rejection of impunity for such crimes regardless of who may be 
investigated at any level of civilian control or military command. 
(2) The passage and enactment of the Genocide Accountability Act,6 the 
Child Soldiers Accountability Act,7 and the Trafficking in Persons 
Accountability Act8 demonstrated the will of the Congress within the past 
two years to shut down the United States as a sanctuary for perpetrators of 
genocide anywhere in the world, for recruiters and users of child soldiers 
anywhere in the world, and for traffickers in persons anywhere in the world.  
                                                 
2 The international and hybrid criminal tribunals include the International Criminal Tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Iraqi High Tribunal, the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, and the International Criminal Court.  The term 
“atrocity crimes” is explained in David Scheffer, Genocide and Atrocity Crimes, 1.3 Genocide Stud. & 
Prevention 229 (2006); and David Scheffer, The Merits of Unifying Terms: ‘Atrocity Crimes’ and ‘Atrocity 
Law,’ 2.1 Genocide Stud. &  Prevention 91 (2007). 
3 Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009, S. 1346, 111th Cong. (2009). 
4 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
5 Id. 
6 Genocide Accountability Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2007). 
7 Child Soldiers Accountability Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 118, 213 (2008). 
8 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 223, 122 Stat. 5044 
(2008). 
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There should be consistent application of the rules of jurisdiction in the 
coverage of atrocity crimes in the federal criminal code, including application 
to all U.S. citizens, to U.S. government employees and contractors, and to all 
aliens present in U.S. territory for the commission of atrocity crimes 
anywhere in the world. 
(3) Continue to eliminate from U.S. law all statutes of limitations for atrocity 
crimes. 
(4) Amend the federal criminal code, title 18 of the U.S. Code, so that it 
enables U.S. courts to prosecute crimes against humanity and war crimes that 
are already codified in the statutes of the international and hybrid criminal 
tribunals and are defined as part of customary international law.  The Crimes 
Against Humanity Act of 2009 represents a significant development in 
advancing this goal. 
(5) Amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice, title 10 of the U.S. Code, so 
that U.S. courts-martial and military commissions can more effectively and 
unambiguously prosecute crimes against humanity and war crimes that are 
already codified in the statutes of the international and hybrid criminal 
tribunals and defined as part of customary international law. 
(6) Recognize that until such amendments to titles 10 and 18 of the U.S. 
Code are enacted, the United States has an antiquated criminal code and 
military code.  Further recognize that the United States stands at a 
comparative disadvantage with many of its major allies that have modernized 
their national criminal codes in recent years with incorporation of the atrocity 
crimes, in part so as to shield their nationals from investigation and 
prosecution by the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) by demonstrating 
national ability to prosecute such crimes and thus invoke the ICC’s principle 
of complementarity, which defers to national investigations and prosecutions.  
Paradoxically, even as a non-party to the Rome Statute of the ICC (the 
“Rome Statute”),9 the United States today essentially stands more exposed to 
its jurisdiction than do American allies that have modernized their criminal 
codes. 
II. INTRODUCTION 
¶4 In general, U.S. federal criminal law and military law have become comparatively 
antiquated during the last seventeen years in their respective coverage of atrocity crimes, 
while international criminal law has evolved significantly during that period.  The 
prospects of U.S. courts exercising jurisdiction (subject matter, territorial, personal, 
passive, or protective jurisdiction) over atrocity crimes under current law remain 
relatively poor.   U.S. Attorneys, in even the best of jurisdictional circumstances, appear 
                                                 
9 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force on 
July 1, 2002) [hereinafter the Rome Statute]. 
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not to have pursued the types of investigations and possible prosecutions one might 
expect if there were an aggressive commitment to bringing perpetrators of atrocity crimes 
to justice and if the law provided a clear basis for such prosecutions.10  Similar problems 
exist with respect to military courts-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(“UCMJ”).11  A considerable number of nations have leapt far ahead of the United States 
in terms of their national courts being able to investigate and prosecute the full range of 
atrocity crimes.12    
¶5 In contrast, the United States remains an available safe haven for war criminals and 
other perpetrators of atrocity crimes who need not fear prosecution before U.S. courts for 
the commission of crimes against humanity or war crimes under most circumstances if 
they reach U.S. territory either legally or illegally.  Indeed, the fact remains that U.S. 
citizens and U.S. government employees and contractors who may commit certain 
atrocity crimes not covered in federal law or common crimes for which there is no 
extraterritorial jurisdiction may entirely escape any prosecution in the United States.  
Experiences of recent years with security contractors in Iraq, such as Blackwater USA 
(now Xe Services LLP) and DynCorp International, are examples of this dilemma.13  The 
hypothetical possibilities, if not realities, arising from this shortcoming in U.S. federal 
law should be deeply disturbing to any rule of law society. 
¶6 Before examining the gaps in U.S. federal law regarding atrocity crimes, the 
significant progress made by this subcommittee during 2007 and 2008 regarding three 
new laws should be recognized. The Genocide Accountability Act, which Chairman 
                                                 
10 The notable exception has been the sole case (against Emmanuel “Chuckie” Taylor, the former leader of 
Liberia’s Anti-Terrorism Unit) prosecuted under the Criminal Torture Statute (10 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006)) 
since its enactment in 1994.   
11 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2006).  While it remains true that atrocity 
crimes likely could be prosecuted as multiple counts of common crimes under the UCMJ (such as genocide 
as multiple counts of murder or crimes against humanity as cruelty and maltreatment), the UCMJ does not 
provide for the specific atrocity crimes.  The military prosecutor is left pondering whether to charge an 
atrocity crime under the general authority of UCMJ Article 18 or Article 134, which in fact are antiquated 
options rarely, if ever, employed. 
12 Examples include the United Kingdom (International Criminal Court Act 2001, ch. 17, pt. 5, May 11, 
2001); Australia (International Criminal Court Act 2002,  consequential amends., June 28, 2002); Canada 
(Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act 2000, ch. 24, June 29, 2000);  Germany (Code of Crimes 
Against International Law, June 30, 2002); The Netherlands (International Crimes Act 2003, June 19, 
2003); New Zealand (International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act 2000, October 1, 2000); 
Argentina (ICC Implementation Law, Law #26200, Jan. 5, 2007); Spain (The Organic Act 15/2003, Nov. 
25, 2003); South Africa (Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 
2002, July 18, 2002); Norway (Lov om endringer i straffeloven 20. mai 2005 nr. 28 mv., skjerpende og 
formildende omstendigheter, folkemord, rikets selvstendighet, terrorhandlinger, ro, orden og sikkerhet, og 
offentlig myndighet, 7 mars 2008 nr. 4. [The Criminal Code, ch. 16,  Mar. 7, 2008]); and Finland 
(212/2008 Laki rikoslain muuttamisesta [Law Amending the Penal Code] May 1, 2008).  Other countries 
that have enacted amendments to their criminal codes to incorporate crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Rome Statute include Armenia, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, Congo-Brazzaville, Costa Rica, 
Cote D’Ivoire, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Estonia, Georgia, Mali, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, and Trinidad and Tobago.  Relevant laws available at 
http://www.legal-tools.org/en/access-to-the-tools/national-implementing-legislation-database/.  Nations that 
are state parties to the Rome Statute and have considered or are in the process of legislating incorporation 
of atrocity crimes into their respective criminal codes include France, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, and Brazil. 
13 James Vicini, Blackwater Guards Charged in Iraq Ahooting, REUTERS, Dec. 8, 2008, available at 
http://reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE4B73YS20081208; Alissa J. Rubin & Paul von Zielbauer, 
Blackwater Case Highlights Legal Uncertainties, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007, at A1; Hearing on Private 
Security Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan Before the House of Rep. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t 
Reform, 110th Cong. (2007).  
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Durbin and Senator Coburn originally co-sponsored, closed a critical gap in U.S. law 
regarding the crime of genocide.  Whereas past law permitted only the prosecution of a 
U.S. national who commits genocide anywhere in the world or an alien who commits 
genocide in the United States, the Genocide Accountability Act ensures that U.S. courts 
can judge any alien who commits genocide anywhere in the world provided that alien is 
found in the United States.  The law closed the gap that used to create a safe haven in the 
United States for alleged alien perpetrators of genocide who managed to reach U.S. 
territory.14    
¶7 The Child Soldiers Accountability Act, also originally co-sponsored by Chairman 
Durbin and Senator Coburn, closed a glaring gap in U.S. law regarding child soldiers.  
The law criminalizes (1) recruitment, enlistment, conscription, or use of child soldiers 
(less than fifteen years of age) in the United States by anyone, and (2) recruitment, 
enlistment, conscription, or use of child soldiers (less than fifteen years of age) anywhere 
in the world by a U.S. national or any alien present in the United States.  It also renders 
any alien engaged in such conduct inadmissible to the United States or deportable from 
the United States.  Formerly, there was no prohibition under U.S. federal law to the 
recruitment, enlistment, conscription, or use of child soldiers under fifteen years of age, 
thus providing safe haven to any alien in U.S. territory who engaged in such conduct and 
granted peace of mind to any American who recruited or used children under fifteen years 
of age anywhere in the world.  This type of criminal conduct is prohibited under 
modernized criminal statutes in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Germany, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, Spain, and Argentina (which raised the 
minimum age to eighteen) and in Articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome 
Statute.  
¶8 The Trafficking in Persons Accountability Act of 2008, which was enacted as part 
of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act at the end of 2008, shuts down 
the United States as a sanctuary for any citizen or any alien lawfully admitted or 
otherwise present in the United States who engaged in sex trafficking, slavery, forced 
labor, involuntary servitude, or peonage anywhere in the world.  This new law closed the 
gap in U.S. law that permitted such prosecutions only of U.S. citizens charged with 
human trafficking conducted anywhere in the world and of aliens who engaged in human 
trafficking in the United States.  Now aliens who arrive in the United States and who are 
                                                 
14 This dilemma was glaringly apparent in two of my own experiences as Ambassador at Large for War 
Crimes Issues.  The first was the inability to consider charging Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, who was indicted 
by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and arrested in Laredo, Texas in December 1996, in 
federal court with the crime of genocide in the event he successfully blocked his transfer to the ICTR to 
stand trial in Arusha, Tanzania. Since he was an alien who was charged with committing genocide outside 
the United States, U.S. law barred prosecuting him for genocide. If we had not prevailed in federal court to 
uphold our authority to transfer him, he would have lived a free man in the United States. The federal 
litigation spanned four years: Surrender of Ntakirutimana, 988 F.Supp 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1997); In re 
Ntakirutimana, 1998 WL 655708 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 1998); Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 
1999); Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 528 U.S. 1135 (2000). The second experience concerned Pol Pot, whom we 
had wanted to have the option of bringing to the United States to stand trial for crimes against humanity 
and genocide in Cambodia from 1975 to 1979 in the event he could have been apprehended prior to his 
death in 1998. The Department of Justice advised that U.S. courts probably would have no jurisdiction over 
Pol Pot, and thus we had to seek a foreign jurisdiction, which proved very time-consuming, where he could 
be transported if captured.  In the end, time spent trying to overcome U.S. jurisdictional inadequacies 
enhanced Pol Pot’s chances of avoiding imminent capture and eliminated the opportunity to move more 
decisively against him. 
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responsible for trafficking of persons outside the United States are subject to 
investigation and prosecution for such actions. 
¶9 Unfortunately, genocide, the recruitment, enlistment, conscription, or use of child 
soldiers, and trafficking in persons comprise only a fraction of atrocity crimes, and the 
United States remains an actual or potential safe haven for perpetrators of a great many of 
the atrocity crimes that can now be prosecuted in a number of foreign jurisdictions and 
before the international and hybrid criminal tribunals.  The recently-introduced Crimes 
Against Humanity Act of 2009, which will be examined in detail below, incorporates the 
trafficking crimes covered by the new law, albeit with the much higher threshold of 
gravity required for the prosecution of crimes against humanity.   
¶10 On a related front, it would be fallacious to assume that the United States 
necessarily could rely only upon its bilateral extradition treaties to resolve the impunity 
gap for a wide range of crimes against humanity and war crimes because (1) most 
extradition treaties require that the crime at issue (and for which the individual would be 
extradited to stand trial) must be punishable under the laws of both Contracting States, 
and many of the atrocity crimes are not punishable in either of the Contracting States, 
including the United States, (2) one can safely conclude that many of the jurisdictions 
that could exercise jurisdiction over an alleged alien perpetrator of an atrocity crime or a 
common war criminal, and with which the United States has an extradition treaty, cannot 
be relied upon to seek extradition of the individual from the United States and guarantee 
credible prosecution of him or her, and (3) the United States has bilateral extradition 
treaties with just over 100 foreign jurisdictions, meaning that with respect to the almost 
100 other nations, there is no option for extradition pursuant to a treaty obligation. 
¶11 Beyond the recent developments in legislation described above, there is a broader 
landscape upon which well-recognized crimes against humanity and war crimes are 
absent from the federal criminal code (title 18 of the U.S. Code) and from the U.S. 
military code (title 10 of the U.S. Code).  These gaps in U.S. law have become much 
more pronounced in recent years as other jurisdictions, particularly among America’s 
major allies, have modernized their criminal codes.  In this testimony, I will examine both 
title 18 and title 10 and how the two titles of the U.S. Code should be more coherently 
inter-related and strengthened.  But first the stage should be set with the jurisdictional 
reach of U.S. law for atrocity crimes. 
III. JURISDICTIONAL REACH OF U.S. LAW 
¶12 Generally absent from U.S. law is the kind of jurisdictional regime that would 
provide the most pragmatic sphere of coverage to ensure that perpetrators of atrocity 
crimes cannot find safe haven in the United States.  Current U.S. law on atrocity crimes 
typically exhibits a narrow range of jurisdiction, covering actions of U.S. citizens 
(although not necessarily if such action takes place abroad) or crimes which occur in U.S. 
territory.  There is an expansive use of extraterritorial jurisdiction for terrorism, narcotics 
trafficking, and hostage-taking criminal laws, but similar extraterritorial applications have 
not yet reached atrocity crimes under U.S. law.  This shortfall has begun to be covered by 
the Genocide Accountability Act, the Child Soldiers Accountability Act, and the 
Trafficking in Persons Accountability Act, but other massive criminal conduct remains 
unregulated by federal law. 
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¶13 The gaps in U.S. law would be filled most pragmatically and effectively if the 
following jurisdictional criteria were established: 
Territorial jurisdiction: The crime has occurred in the United States or in any 
foreign territory under the effective control of U.S. authorities (including 
occupied territory and U.S. military facilities) or, if another jurisdictional 
prong described below exists, anywhere else in the world. 
Personal jurisdiction: The alleged perpetrator is a U.S. citizen or U.S. 
government employee or contractor acting anywhere in the world or an alien 
who is present in U.S. territory with respect to any commission of an atrocity 
crime anywhere in the world. 
Subject matter jurisdiction: The crime is an atrocity crime, namely genocide, 
a crime against humanity, or a war crime as such crimes are defined under 
U.S. law15 and/or international law in terms of their magnitude and 
systematic or planned character.   
Passive personality jurisdiction: Federal jurisdiction should be triggered in 
respect of any American citizen who is a victim of an atrocity crime 
anywhere in the world and thus reach any perpetrator of an atrocity crime 
against such American victim. 
Protective jurisdiction: Where U.S. interests abroad are directly threatened by 
an atrocity crime, U.S. courts should have the power to prosecute alleged 
perpetrators of any such crime.  Such U.S. interests include threats to U.S. 
citizens, U.S. diplomatic and military facilities and assets, and U.S. 
sovereignty interests. 
¶14 I have already addressed progress with respect to the crimes of genocide, 
recruitment, enlistment, conscription, or use of child soldiers, and trafficking in persons, 
for which laws have been enacted within the last two years.  I will concentrate the rest of 
my testimony on crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
IV. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
¶15 Crimes against humanity, as they are now defined in the statutes of the international 
and hybrid criminal tribunals and in modernized criminal codes of many foreign 
jurisdictions, require a particular context: that, with some exceptions, the individual crime 
is part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population in furtherance of a 
State or organizational policy.  U.S. federal criminal law provides for the prosecution of 
some underlying substantive crimes found in the now conventional list of crimes against 
humanity, but federal law does not generally specify distinct criminal liability based on 
the extent of the planned attack or the link to State policy.    
                                                 
15 In this testimony, I examine continued amendment of U.S. law so that it incorporates the full range of 
atrocity crimes. 
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¶16 U.S. law certainly provides the means to prosecute as common crimes such acts as 
murder, torture, slavery, kidnapping, sexual abuse, or rape under narrowly-defined 
circumstances set forth in title 18 of the U.S. Code.16 But none of these codified crimes in 
title 18 carry the additional requirements distinguishing crimes against humanity from 
common crimes.  Nor does title 18 include some of the well-established crimes against 
humanity, even as common crimes, which constitute the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals and the international and hybrid criminal 
tribunals of the last seventeen years,17 as well as the modernized criminal codes of some 
American allies.18  
¶17 Furthermore, there is generally no extraterritorial application of title 18 common 
crimes;  although there are some exceptions, U.S. courts are typically unable to prosecute 
an American citizen or an alien who is in the United States for alleged commission of 
either a title 18 common crime outside the United States or a crime against humanity 
outside the United States.  These are huge gaps in U.S. law which would permit alien 
atrocity warlords to find safe haven in the United States and which deny U.S. courts the 
ability to prosecute American citizens who commit crimes against humanity anywhere in 
the world.  This is the case even though prosecution under statutory circumstances of the 
common crime of murder or rape or torture or slavery or kidnapping or sexual abuse, 
typically with a single victim or very few victims, may provide a measure of justice.  But 
such common crime prosecutions fall far short of what a successful prosecution of a 
crime against humanity, with multiple victims (sometimes in the tens of thousands), 
would entail and what it would signify as America’s commitment to the rule of law.   
¶18 Federal criminal law also has statutes of limitations that generally confine 
indictments to a five-year window following commission of the crime unless it is a 
capital offense.19 Such statutes of limitations have been abandoned in international and 
much foreign practice in light of the magnitude and serious character of crimes against 
humanity.  Leaders engaged in such conduct and shielded by their continuing control of 
the government and law enforcement authorities (particularly in autocratic states) 
typically will not be exposed to apprehension or be inclined to surrender to the courts for 
prosecution within such a relatively short period following commission of a crime against 
humanity.20   
                                                 
16 Inter alia, 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (murder); § 2340 (torture); § 1584 (sale into involuntary servitude); § 1589 
(forced labor); § 1201 (kidnapping); § 2242 (sexual abuse); § 2241 (aggravated sexual abuse). 
17 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, art. 6(c), 
Aug. 8 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; Charter for the International Military Tribunal of the Far 
East, art. 5(c), Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. 1589, 4 Bevans 20 (1968); Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 5, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); See 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 3, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 
(Nov. 8, 1994); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 2, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145; 
Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal, art. 12, Oct. 18, 2005, available at 
www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf; Rome Statute, supra note 10, 
art. 7. 
18 See supra note 13. 
19 See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006).   
20 None of the international or hybrid criminal tribunals have any comparable statute of limitations on the 
prosecution of crimes falling within their jurisdiction.  Further, there are no statutes of limitations in the 
modernized criminal codes covering atrocity crimes of the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, France (for 
“serious crimes,” defined by the French Constitutional Court as so serious as to be of concern to the 
international community as a whole), Germany, the Netherlands (except for the least serious war crimes 
which are limited to 12 years), New Zealand, and South Africa. 
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¶19 The stark reality is that under U.S. federal law, there is no provision for any crime 
against humanity per se, meaning there is no defined and codified crime that must be 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack, pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or 
organizational policy to commit such attack, and which constitutes the multiple 





 deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
 imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty; 
 torture; 
 rape; 
 sexual slavery; 
 enforced prostitution; 
 forced pregnancy; 
 enforced sterilization; 
 sexual violence; 
 persecution; 
 enforced disappearance of persons; 
 apartheid; or 
 other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. 
¶20 Such crimes against humanity have been defined and incorporated in the criminal 
codes of Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, 
Spain, Argentina, Norway, Finland, and the United Kingdom. 21  These countries 
previously had been in similar circumstances as the United States but, because of their 
participation in the ICC, they modernized their criminal codes so as to enable themselves 
to prosecute the same crimes as are within the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC.  
Under the principle of complementarity found in the Rome Statute,22 a nation’s ability 
and willingness to prosecute the same crimes as found in ICC jurisdiction essentially 
shields that nation’s nationals from ICC scrutiny.  Paradoxically, some of America’s 
allies, as states parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, now are more insulated from ICC 
investigation than is the United States, even as a non-party to the Rome Statute, because 
our allies have modernized their criminal codes to fully incorporate genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes for possible investigation and prosecution against 
alleged civilian and military perpetrators.23   
                                                 
21 See supra note 13. 
22 Rome Statute, supra note 10, arts. 17-19. 
23 See Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20 (2001) (This article received the 
American Bar Association’s military writing award); see also Michael P. Hatchell, Closing the Gaps in 
United States Law and Implementing the Rome Statute: A Comparative Approach, ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 183 (2005).     
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¶21 It is certainly possible, without amending the law, to cherry pick one’s way through 
Title 18 and cobble together barely plausible examples of common crimes, such as the 
federal kidnapping statute,24 that could be prosecuted in the spirit of a particular crime 
against humanity, such as imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in 
violation of the fundamental rules of international law.  But U.S. attorneys would have to 
become exceptionally innovative, and take considerable risks in the courtroom, to 
prosecute one of the common crimes under Title 18 as a crime against humanity.  There 
has not yet been a single federal criminal prosecution of a crime against humanity as 
such, despite the presence of many aliens on U.S. territory who may qualify for 
investigation for such crimes. 
¶22 A similar predicament arises when examining how a crime against humanity would 
be prosecuted against military personnel in U.S. military courts.  There is no provision in 
the UCMJ that explicitly codifies a crime against humanity.25  It would be a stretch, and 
entail similar risks, for a military prosecutor to seek to refashion the common crimes set 
forth in the UCMJ, with their narrow definitions and relatively short (typically five year) 
statutes of limitations,26 into full-fledged crimes against humanity.  Since there is no 
UCMJ crime that could easily be translated into, for example, the crime against humanity 
of persecution or of enslavement or of enforced disappearance of persons, U.S. military 
courts are without the power to prosecute military personnel under any circumstances for 
some crimes against humanity that do not interface with any of the common crimes set 
forth in the UCMJ.   
¶23 In fact, there exists no explicit authority under Title 10 of the U.S. Code to 
prosecute any crime against humanity as a stand-alone codified crime.  This means that it 
may prove very difficult to frame relevant charges (thus requiring resort to charges of 
common crimes) against any suspected perpetrators of crimes against humanity who are 
U.S. military personnel anywhere in the chain of command, including at the highest 
levels of military leadership.  The prosecutor’s alternative would be to charge one of the 
UCMJ’s common crimes, which may fall far short of a crime against humanity charge. 
While an antiquated notion of military justice—focusing on common crimes and a 
general jurisdiction over war crimes—may remain useful under the UCMJ, the inability 
of U.S. military lawyers to bring an explicit crime against humanity charge may enable 
the individual to escape liability under U.S. law while exposing such individual to the 
scrutiny of a foreign court (with a modernized criminal code and where the crime may 
have allegedly occurred) or international or hybrid criminal tribunals that are familiar 
with the prosecution of crimes against humanity regarding military personnel and 
exercise vigorous jurisdiction over such crimes. Much of the litigation before the 
international criminal tribunals involves indictments that charge individuals with both 
crimes against humanity and war crimes against military commanders, and there have 
been convictions for commission of both types of crimes.27   Ideally, Title 10 of the U.S. 
                                                 
24 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). 
25 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2006). 
26 10 U.S.C. § 843 (2006). 
27 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Trial Chamber Opinion and Judgment, ¶¶ 741-3 (May 7, 1997) 
(defendant charged with and convicted of crimes against humanity and war crimes); Prosecutor v. Jelisic, 
Case No. IT-95-10, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 58 (Dec. 14, 1999) (defendant charged with and convicted 
of crimes against humanity and war crimes); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial 
Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 638, 645 (Sep. 2, 1998) (defendant charged with crimes against humanity and 
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Code would be amended so as to enable military lawyers to bring full-bodied crimes 
against humanity charges against U.S. military personnel and thus deflect any foreign or 
international tribunal scrutiny of any such alleged conduct by an American serviceman.   
¶24 Under federal criminal law, the United States remains in large measure a free haven 
for perpetrators of crimes against humanity.  This is particularly true of any alien who is 
found on U.S. territory and who may have perpetrated a crime against humanity outside 
the United States.  It is also largely true of any U.S. citizen who may perpetrate a crime 
against humanity overseas or, if responsible for one in U.S. territory, may only be charged 
with a common crime that does not reflect the magnitude or importance of the atrocity 
crime for which he or she should be held accountable. 
V. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY ACT OF 2009 
¶25 Fortunately, help is on the way.  Senators Durbin, Patrick Leahy, and Russ Feingold 
introduced S. 1346, The Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009 on June 24, 2009.  The 
purpose of the legislation is to penalize crimes against humanity and it thus marks a 
significant advancement in closing the impunity gap in U.S. law for atrocity crimes.  It 
remains a limited piece of legislation as the bill covers many but not all crimes against 
humanity.28  The bill hews closely to established common crimes under the federal 
criminal code and adds to them the gravity context required for a charge of crimes against 
humanity.  This approach differs from the way in which our major allies have revised 
their criminal codes to incorporate crimes against humanity, as they have incorporated the 
more explicitly stated and defined crimes against humanity known to international law.  
Nonetheless, the bill serves the worthy objective of penalizing a good number of crimes 
against humanity and ensuring that the United States is no sanctuary for those who 
commit such crimes anywhere in the world.  
¶26 Interestingly, S. 1346 requires in the gravity, or magnitude, requirement for crimes 
against humanity that the crime be “part of a widespread and systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population, and with knowledge of the attack. . . .”  The only novel 
part of this definition, for which I do not know the drafters’ rationale, is the conjunctive 
pairing of “widespread and systematic” in describing the nature of the attack.  On its face, 
this appears to create a high hurdle to leap over to prosecute a suspect, for it requires 
proof of two factors regarding the attack:  that it is pursuant to or in furtherance of a 
policy of a state or armed group and that it results in multiple victims.  A random, 
unplanned slaughter of civilians by a crazed warlord may not qualify because the 
“policy” for such an attack cannot be established.  Alternatively, a highly planned state 
                                                                                                                                                 
violations of the Geneva Conventions); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, Trial Chamber 
Judgment and Sentence, ¶¶ 403-445 (Dec. 6, 1999) (defendant charged with crimes against humanity and 
violations of the Geneva Conventions).  
28 For example, the bill fails to explicitly incorporate the well established crimes against humanity of 
deportation or forcible transfer of population (other than in the context of “national, ethnic, racial, or 
religious cleansing”), enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, persecution (other than in the context of 
“national, ethnic, racial, or religious cleansing”), enforced disappearance of persons, apartheid, and “other 
inhumane acts of a similar character (regarding all crimes against humanity) causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.”  See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(1)(d), (g)-
(k).  There may be good reason in the future to address this lingering gap in federal law on crimes against 
humanity in the event the Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009 is not amended prior to passage to include 
such crimes. 
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policy to exterminate an ethnic minority may be within hours of implementation, but may 
be aborted for any number of reasons, leaving the suspects free to plot again and perhaps 
succeed the next time.  Since no multiple victims resulted (as the policy was not 
activated), the suspects could not be prosecuted under the Bill’s formulation of the crime 
against humanity of extermination.  All of the definitions for crimes against humanity in 
the statutes of the International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Iraqi High Tribunal, the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia, and the ICC employ the disjunctive and require that the attack 
be “widespread or systematic,” thus enabling those courts to prosecute individuals who 
either cause multiple victims to suffer or act pursuant to or in furtherance of a policy to 
commit such crime.   
¶27 The point I am making, however, may be a distinction without a difference.  The 
Rome Statute essentially pairs the two words together even though it uses the formula of 
“widespread or systematic” in its definition of crimes against humanity.  The union 
occurs in that part of the definition that requires there to be an “attack directed against 
any civilian population.”  Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute defines “attack directed 
against any civilian population” to mean “a course of conduct involving the multiple 
commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 [the listing of crimes against humanity] 
against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational 
policy to commit such attack. . . .”  It would be difficult to accomplish the required attack 
against a civilian population and satisfy the definitional requirements of the Rome Statute 
without both the commission of multiple acts (hence “widespread”) and a state or 
organizational policy driving such an attack.29  The identical formulation is repeated in 
the Introduction to Crimes Against Humanity in the Elements of Crimes to the Rome 
Statute.30 
¶28 The judgments delivered by the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda have emphasized the disjunctive nature of the definition, but the 
facts usually point to the reality that a widespread attack on a civilian population arises 
from some kind of policy or plan, even if either is inferred, or because the state tolerates 
the atrocities of non-governmental actors.  The policy, plan, or ambivalence or inaction of 
the State drives the killing machine toward a widespread attack on civilians.31  In light of 
the statutory formulation in the Rome Statute, which points to a closer bond between a 
“widespread” and a “systematic” attack on a civilian population, S. 1346 should not be 
read as a radical departure from international law.  In fact, the legislation may reflect a 
                                                 
29 See WILLIAM SHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 101-104 (2006) [hereinafter 
SCHABAS]. 
30 Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7, Crimes Against 
Humanity, Introduction, §3. 
31 See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber Judgment ¶¶ 543-555 (Jan. 14, 2000) 
(“National case law tends, in particular, to emphasise that crimes against humanity are usually the 
manifestation of a criminal governmental policy . . . While crimes against humanity are normally 
perpetrated by State organs, i.e. individuals acting in an official capacity such as military commanders, 
servicemen, etc., there may be cases where the authors of such crimes are individuals having neither 
official status nor acting on behalf of a governmental authority.  The available case law seems to indicate 
that in these cases some sort of explicit or implicit approval or endorsement by State or governmental 
authorities is required, or else that it is necessary for the offence to be clearly encouraged by a general 
governmental policy or to clearly fit within such a policy.”). 
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more realistic understanding of what constitutes the magnitude requirements for a crime 
against humanity under international law. 
¶29 The Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009 codifies sixteen separate crimes against 
humanity.  The logic behind twelve of the crimes derives from their current status as 
common crimes in Title 18 of the U.S. Code.  S. 1346 simply attaches the gravity 
requirement for a crime against humanity (“widespread and systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population, and with knowledge of the attack”) to the common crime 
so as to codify it as a crime against humanity.  The common crimes are murder,32 
peonage,33 kidnapping or carrying away individuals for involuntary servitude or slavery,34 
involuntary servitude,35 forced labor,36 trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery, 
involuntary servitude, or forced labor,37 sex trafficking of children by force, fraud, or 
coercion,38 aggravated sexual abuse by force or threat,39 sexual abuse,40 kidnapping,41 
hostage taking,42 and torture.43  The crime of peonage in the United States is associated 
with holding workers in servitude, particularly in southeastern states.  “Peonage” is not a 
term that has migrated into the lexicon of crimes against humanity in the modern era.   
¶30 Nonetheless, although expressed somewhat differently in several instances, the 
other federal crimes listed immediately above can be associated with well-known crimes 
against humanity under international law, as confirmed in the statutes of the international 
and hybrid criminal tribunals exercising jurisdiction over crimes against humanity.  The 
fact that the Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009 does not establish a mirror image of 
all of the crimes against humanity set forth in the Rome Statute and the statutes of other 
tribunals should not detract from the significant progress represented by the legislation in 
closing gaps in federal law with respect to atrocity crimes. 
¶31 The new crimes introduced by the Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009, which do 
not currently appear in the federal criminal code, are extermination, national, ethnic, 
racial, or religious cleansing, arbitrary detention, and imposed measures intended to 
prevent births.  The crime against humanity of extermination is well established in 
international law and is found in all of the statutes of the tribunals.44  Extermination has 
been prosecuted successfully in many cases before the tribunals.  The legislation provides 
that the crime of extermination “means subjecting a civilian population to conditions of 
life that are intended to cause the physical destruction of the group in whole or in part.”  
The Rome Statute, employing similar terminology, defines the crime of extermination as 
including “the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of 
                                                 
32 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2006). 
33 18 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2006). 
34 18 U.S.C. § 1583(a)(1) (2006). 
35 18 U.S.C. § 1584(a) (2006). 
36 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a) (2006). 
37 18 U.S.C. § 1590(a) (2006). 
38 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2006). 
39 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2006). 
40 18 U.S.C. § 2242 (2006). 
41 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2006). 
42 18 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (2006). 
43 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006). 
44 See ALEXANDER ZAHAR & GORAN SLUITER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 216-17 (2008) [hereinafter 
ZAHAR & SLUITER]; ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 109-110 (2nd ed. 2008) 
[hereinafter CASSESE]; SCHABAS, supra note 30, at 199-201. 
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access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a 
population.”45 
¶32 Arbitrary detention falls naturally under the crime against humanity of 
imprisonment in international law and in the tribunal statutes.  The Rome Statute 
elaborates with a description of “imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical 
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law.”46  The jurisprudence of the 
tribunals focuses essentially on charges of arbitrary detention against defendants that 
involve prolonged imprisonment without due process of law.47  The definition for 
“arbitrary detention” provided for in the Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009 
establishes a direct connection to international law, as it describes the term as meaning 
“imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty except on such grounds and 
in accordance with such procedure as are established by the law of the jurisdiction where 
such imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty took place.”  Thus, a 
crime against humanity of arbitrary detention should serve a comparable purpose in 
federal law as that found in international law for the crime against humanity of 
imprisonment. 
¶33 The crime against humanity of “imposed measures intended to prevent births” 
would appear to be most directly aligned with the crime against humanity of “enforced 
sterilization” in the Rome Statute,48 which, however, does not define the term.  But the 
words used in the Rome Statute logically describe imposed measures intended to prevent 
births, so the correlation exists between the legislation and the Rome Statute.  The 
Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute require that the crime against humanity of 
enforced sterilization occurs where the perpetrator deprived one or more persons of 
biological reproductive capacity, the conduct was neither justified by the medical or 
hospital treatment of the person or persons concerned nor carried out with their genuine 
consent, the conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population, and the perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of, or 
intended the conduct to be part of, a widespread or systematic attack directed against a 
civilian population.49  Although the Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009 does not 
import these elements, or use any definition, to describe “imposed measures intended to 
prevent births,” the Rome Statute offers useful guidance for how this crime is intended to 
be interpreted under international law and thus how U.S. courts might address the issue. 
¶34 The proposed crime against humanity of “national, ethnic, racial, or religious 
cleansing,” which is more commonly referred to simply as “ethnic cleansing,” is not a 
crime as such under international law.  The term does not appear in any of the tribunal 
statutes and no tribunal has convicted anyone for the crime of ethnic cleansing.  But the 
term ethnic cleansing has been employed in the judgments of the tribunals to describe the 
practical result of the well-established crime against humanity of persecution.  This 
understanding of the crime against of humanity of persecution is so significant today that 
“ethnic cleansing” has become essentially synonymous in meaning with “persecution.”50  
                                                 
45 Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(2)(b). 
46 Id. at art. 7(1)(e). 
47 See CASSESE, supra note 45, at 110-111; SCHABAS, supra note 30, at 205. 
48 Rome Statute, supra note 10, at art. 7(1)(g); see SCHABAS, supra note 30, at 211, 214. 
49 Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(g)-5. 
50 See ZAHAR & SLUITER, supra note 45, at 211-215. 
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The Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009 leaps into the self-evident reality of ethnic 
cleansing as a crime against humanity rather than using the more conventional 
terminology of persecution as a crime against humanity, the latter term having become a 
complex definitional formula buried deep within tribunal jurisprudence and by which the 
tribunals have prosecuted and convicted individuals for what the rest of the world 
understands to be ethnic cleansing.  
¶35 The legislation defines “national, ethnic, racial, or religious cleansing” to mean “the 
intentional and forced displacement from one country to another or within a country of 
any national group, ethnic group, racial group, or religious group in whole or in part, by 
expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, except 
when the displacement is in accordance with applicable laws of armed conflict that 
permit involuntary and temporary displacement of a population to ensure its security or 
when imperative military reasons so demand.”  The prohibitive part of this definition 
comports with what the world witnessed in recent years in the Balkans and in Darfur and 
during the 1980s and 1990s in Iraq.  The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, in particular, has determined frequently in its judgments that such expulsion 
or other coercive acts against an ethnic or religious group occurred frequently, and 
defendants have been prosecuted and convicted for planning and executing such acts.  
But the charges and convictions have combined the crime against humanity of 
persecutions with other crimes against humanity, such as deportation, torture, 
imprisonment, rape, and extermination, to cover what is more commonly described as 
ethnic cleansing.  The legislation achieves essentially the same aim but does so more 
frontally by employing the term “cleansing” (paired with “national, ethnic, racial, or 
religious”) and by describing “expulsion or other coercive acts” as the means by which to 
achieve ethnic cleansing.  The bill does not resort to the formula in the practice of the 
tribunals and in the Rome Statute itself that links “persecution” with the other crimes 
against humanity set forth in the relevant statute before obtaining a conviction on the 
“persecution” charge, even though the task before the tribunal judges is one of finding 
criminal responsibility for what is popularly called “ethnic cleansing.” 
¶36 Another primary issue is found in Section 519(d) of the Crimes Against Humanity 
Act of 2009, which denies any statute of limitations for the crimes set forth in the 
proposed law.  This conforms to a similar denial of any statute of limitations in the 
genocide provisions of the federal criminal code.51  There is no statute of limitations for 
crimes against humanity under any of the tribunal statutes,52 so in that respect the 
legislation is well positioned to ensure that the United States can investigate and 
prosecute crimes against humanity as a matter of domestic law and consistent with the 
principle of complementarity in the event and whenever the ICC seeks to exercise 
jurisdiction in a matter that falls within U.S. jurisdiction.  However, the Child Soldiers 
Accountability Act imposes a statute of limitations requiring the indictment or 
information “not later than 10 years after the commission of the offense.”53   
¶37 It is entirely possible to categorize the recruitment or use of child soldiers as part of 
a crime against humanity, particularly where such action relates to murder, kidnapping, 
involuntary servitude, forced labor, slavery, sexual abuse, or torture. There probably 
                                                 
51 18 U.S.C. § 1091(e) (2006). 
52 See discussion in note 21. 
53 18 U.S.C. § 213 (2006). 
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would be no insurmountable obstacle to charging child soldier recruitment or use within 
the parameters of a crime against humanity, which would benefit from unlimited time to 
file charges.  But this is not the cleanest formulation. There would be greater consistency 
in the context of atrocity crimes and filling gaps in U.S. law if the statute of limitations 
were eliminated from the Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008.   
¶38 Under current law, a guerrilla warlord who massively recruits and uses thousands 
of child soldiers in Africa may, only eleven years later, safely reside in the United States 
as an alien for the purpose of finding sanctuary from prosecution elsewhere.  Passage of 
the Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2009 at least would expose such person to possible 
prosecution in U.S. courts for a crime against humanity.  But it would be far preferable 
simply to close the loophole in the Child Soldiers Accountability Act, which has none of 
the gravity thresholds that would be required to prove a charge of crimes against 
humanity.  If that gap were closed, the result would be a more comprehensive assault on 
the opportunities for impunity for both citizens and aliens found on U.S. territory. 
VI. WAR CRIMES 
¶39 It may seem remarkable to some that there are gaps in both U.S. federal law and 
U.S. military law in the ability of federal courts and courts-martial and even military 
commissions to prosecute war crimes.  After all that has been experienced since the 
precedents of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals and the scores of cases 
prosecuted by the international criminal tribunals during the last seventeen years, one 
would be forgiven to assume that surely in the United States the law is now well 
established to enable U.S. courts (criminal and military) to investigate and prosecute the 
full range of war crimes that have been codified in treaty law and defined as a matter of 
customary international law. That, however, is not the case.   
¶40 While there certainly are some war crimes that can be fully prosecuted under U.S. 
law, there are many for which there is no jurisdiction in U.S. criminal law and there is 
uncertain or vague jurisdiction in U.S. military law.  The primary federal law, the War 
Crimes Act of 1996, as amended in 1997 and again in 2006,54 is enforceable only in 
circumstances where the perpetrator or the victim of the war crime is a U.S. citizen or a 
member of the U.S. armed forces.  An alien can be prosecuted only if the victim is a U.S. 
citizen or a member of the U.S. armed forces.  If an alien arrives in the United States 
having committed war crimes against victims of a foreign nationality in foreign territory 
or the alien commits such war crimes in U.S. territory, and the only victims are other 
aliens, there is no basis for prosecuting that individual in a federal criminal court on war 
crimes charges.  (Of course, there may be grounds to bring charges for common crimes 
against the alien unleashing violence on U.S. territory.)  In contrast, modernized criminal 
codes of some of America’s major allies now empower their criminal courts to prosecute 
the full range of war crimes and to do so against a far wider range of potential defendants, 
including aliens found in the prosecuting state’s territory.55   
                                                 
54 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006). 
55 For example, the United Kingdom criminalized all of the war crimes set forth in Article 8.2 of the Rome 
Statute of the ICC (International Criminal Court Act 2001, ch. 17, § 50(1), May 11, 2001) and can 
prosecute any alien who commits war crimes (or genocide or crimes against humanity) outside the United 
Kingdom provided such person subsequently becomes resident in the United Kingdom (International 
Criminal Court Act 2001, ch. 17, § 68(1)). 
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¶41 The most commonly-known group of war crimes—the “grave breaches” during 
international armed conflicts under the 1949 Geneva Conventions56—could not be 
prosecuted in federal courts against civilians and members of the U.S. armed forces until 
enactment of the War Crimes Act of 1996.  Thus, the grave breaches of torture, inhuman 
treatment, biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering, destruction and 
appropriation of property, compelling service in hostile forces, denying a fair trial, 
unlawful deportation and transfer, unlawful confinement, and hostage-taking can, as of 
1996, be prosecuted in U.S. federal courts but, remarkably, in fact never have been.57  
The War Crimes Act of 1996 also empowers federal courts to prosecute civilians and 
members of the U.S. armed forces for a group of war crimes sourced back to the Annex 
to Hague Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907).58  
These war crimes consist of attacking undefended places, killing or wounding a person 
hors de combat, improper use of a flag or truce, improper use of a flag, insignia or 
uniform of the hostile party, treacherously killing or wounding, denying quarter, 
destroying or seizing the enemy’s property, depriving the nationals of the hostile power of 
rights or actions, compelling participation in military operations, pillaging, and 
employing poison or poisoned weapons.  Again, however, no such war crimes have ever 
been prosecuted under the War Crimes Act of 1996. 
¶42 In 1997, the War Crimes Act was amended to include violations of Common Article 
3 of the Geneva Conventions.59  This meant that with respect to conduct during non-
international armed conflicts, all of the following violations could be, but never were, 
prosecuted in U.S. federal courts between 1997 and 2006: 
 violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, 
cruel treatment and torture; 
 committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating 
and degrading treatment; 
 taking of hostages; and 
 the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without 
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, 
affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as 
indispensable.  
                                                 
56 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field, arts. 49-50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 33; Geneva Convention (II) for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, arts. 
50-51, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 86;  Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War, arts. 129-30, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention (IV) 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, arts. 146-47, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 
75 U.N.T.S. 288. 
57 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(1) (2006).   
58 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague 
Convention]; see 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(3) (2006). 
59 The amended provision read: “(c) DEFINITION – As used in this section the term ‘war crime’ means 
any conduct . . . (3) which constitutes a violation of common Article 3 of the international conventions 
signed at Geneva, 12 August 1949, or any protocol to such convention to which the United States is a party 
and which deals with non-international armed conflicts.”  18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(3) (as it was codified from 
1997 to 2006). 
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¶43 However, the United States regressed in this field of criminal law with enactment of 
the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (“MCA”).60   The MCA decriminalized certain 
war crimes set forth in Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions for purposes 
of U.S. prosecution and thus created an impunity gap in U.S law.61  Specifically, the 
following violations described in Common Article 3 can no longer be prosecuted in U.S. 
courts following the nine-year period during which they had been criminalized:  
“violence to life and person,” murder “of all kinds” (as opposed to the limited and 
defined circumstances set forth in the MCA), “outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular humiliating and degrading treatment,” and “the passing of sentences and the 
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples.”    
¶44 The MCA denies penal sanctions for certain conduct otherwise criminalized by the 
MCA (murder, mutilation or maiming, and intentionally causing serious bodily injury) in 
connection with the War Crimes Act of 1996 or with respect to crimes triable by the 
military commissions, in the event such conduct occurs in connection with “collateral 
damage” or “death, damage, or injury incident to a lawful attack.”62  These terms are 
left undefined and one is left to speculate why the designation of either consequence 
necessarily extinguishes any criminal liability whatsoever.  The long-standing rules of 
distinction and proportionality in the law of war appear to be tested here.63  Interestingly, 
in the criminal codes of various foreign jurisdictions and in the Rome Statute, a bright 
line has been drawn on the issue of collateral damage. It is a war crime to intentionally 
launch an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or 
injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.64 The latter caveat, of “clearly 
excessive” character, would be a difficult one to achieve for purposes of prosecution but 
it is a standard that has gained widespread acceptance, including among the U.S. armed 
forces.  The MCA’s apparent “collateral damage” gap, one that apparently permits 
collateral damage even if it is inflicted in a manner that is “clearly excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated,” thus narrows the scope of 
liability for war crimes under American law.    
¶45 Despite what may appear to be an impressive compilation of war crimes that can be 
prosecuted under the War Crimes Act of 1996, even in its truncated version following the 
amendments to it under the MCA in 2006, there remain a significant number of war 
crimes under customary international law, as confirmed in both the practice of the 
international and hybrid criminal tribunals and the Rome Statute, that have not been 
codified in U.S. law. In contrast, most, if not all, of these war crimes have been codified 
in the criminal codes of some of America’s major allies, thus empowering them to 
prosecute explicit war crimes, particularly with respect to their own nationals.  The list 
includes the following war crimes, stated in abbreviated form:   
                                                 
60 Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 948(b) (2006). 
61 Id. at § 6(b). 
62 Id. at § 6(b)(3). 
63 See RONALD C. SLYE & BETH VAN SCHAACK, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 180-82 
(2009). 
64 Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 8(2)(b)(iv). 
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(1) Pertaining to international armed conflicts: 
 Attacking civilians 
 Attacking civilian objects 
 Attacking personnel or objects involved in a humanitarian assistance or 
peacekeeping mission 
 Improper use of a flag, insignia or uniform of the United Nations 
 Improper use of the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions 
 Transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its 
own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation 
or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory 
within or outside this territory 
 Attacking protected objects 
 Mutilation 
 Medical or scientific experiments 
 Employing prohibited gases, liquids, materials or devices 
 Employing prohibited bullets 
 Outrages upon personal dignity 
 Rape 
 Sexual slavery 
 Forced prostitution 
 Forced pregnancy 
 Enforced sterilization 
 Sexual violence 
 Using protected persons as human shields 
 Attacking objects or persons using the distinctive emblems of the 
Geneva Conventions 
 Starvation as a method of warfare 
 Using, conscripting, or enlisting children 
(2) Pertaining to non-international armed conflicts: 
 Attacking civilians 
 Attacking personnel or objects involved in a humanitarian assistance or 
peacekeeping mission 
 Attacking protected objects 
 Pillaging 
 Rape 
 Sexual slavery 
 Forced prostitution 
 Forced pregnancy 
 Forced sterilization  
 Sexual violence 
 Using, conscripting, and enlisting children 
 Displacing civilians 
 Treacherously killing or wounding 
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 Denying quarter 
 Mutilation 
 Medical or scientific experiments 
 Destroying or seizing the enemy’s property 
¶46 While it remains possible through innovative interpretation of indictable common 
crimes under the U.S. Code to prosecute an American citizen or a narrow range of aliens 
for one or more common crimes that may overlap with one or more of these unindictable 
war crimes, the haphazard methodology of any such prosecution in the context of war 
crimes denies the United States the opportunity to prosecute such war crimes per se and 
hence identifies the country as a virtual safe haven for those who commit such crimes.  
The complexity of the exercise may explain why there has been no war crimes 
prosecution under the War Crimes Act of 1996, as amended, and why no U.S. attorney 
has sought to portray any prosecution in the federal courts as a war crimes prosecution.   
¶47 When one examines the situation with respect to U.S. military courts, there exist 
many uncertainties and largely a theoretical power to prosecute war crimes rather than 
any significant precedent of doing so.  Much would turn, if the opportunity arose, on the 
military courts’ interpretation of the law of war under international law.   Under 10 U.S.C. 
§ 818, general courts-martial “have jurisdiction to try any person who by the law of war 
is subject to trial by a military tribunal.”  This general provision is elaborated on in the 
Manual for Courts-Martial United States, which states: “General courts-martial may try 
any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by military tribunal for any crime 
against: (a) The law of war. . . .”65  The Manual also provides, “Nothing in this rule limits 
the power of general courts-martial to try persons under the law of war.”66 In addition, 
jurisdiction resides with military commissions and other military tribunals of “concurrent 
jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may 
be tried” by them.67 The reach of U.S. military courts and military commissions over 
civilians in certain circumstances, enemy belligerents of either military or civilian 
character, or foreign nationals of countries not at war with the United States remains 
problematic and may turn on how well-established a particular war crime is under 
principles of universal jurisdiction in international law.68  
¶48 Rather than try to parse the myriad of possibilities for military court jurisdiction 
over the commission of war crimes by U.S. nationals of civilian or military character or 
by aliens of any number of different characterizations, I emphasize one point:  it is not 
possible to extract from the UCMJ, Title 10 of the United States Code, or the 
jurisprudence of U.S. military courts any definitive list of explicit war crimes which such 
military courts are empowered to prosecute against U.S. military personnel, enemy 
belligerents, or civilians engaged or caught up in hostilities or on occupied territory.  One 
exception is the MCA.  Military Commissions established thereunder are empowered to 
prosecute “any offense made punishable by [and defined in the MCA] or the law of war 
when committed by an alien unlawful enemy combatant before, on, or after September 
                                                 
65 United States, Manual for Courts-Martial, R.C.M. 201(f)(a)(B)(i) (2005). 
66 Id. R.C.M. 202(b). 
67 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2006). 
68 Douglass Cassel, Empowering United States Courts to Hear Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 421, 430-32 & nn.40-49 (2001). 
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11, 2001.”69  Although a detailed list of triable offenses that cover many explicit war 
crimes is set forth in the MCA,70 that list does not include all established war crimes, and 
thus the Commissions’ supplemental jurisdiction over the “law of war” may need to 
trigger the prosecution of additional war crimes in the future. 
¶49 The UCMJ Article 32 investigations71 and, in some cases, courts-martial of U.S. 
service personnel arising from U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, have not, 
to date, been grounded on charges of war crimes, even though on the surface many of the 
incidents might invite serious scrutiny as possible war crimes and certainly, to the rest of 
world, appear to exhibit characteristics of war crimes.  Rather, these investigations and 
courts-martial have relied upon the punitive articles of the UCMJ,72 few of which 
constitute a war crime per se and are more properly understood as common crimes that 
may be committed by American soldiers.  Typical charges in connection with cases 
arising from Iraq or Afghanistan are assault, failure to obey an order or regulation, 
murder, cruelty and maltreatment, dereliction of duty, manslaughter, rape, and conduct 
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman—all charges that also could be brought as crimes 
against fellow soldiers or civilians in the United States.   Because the UCMJ does not 
have a clearly identifiable list of war crimes in its punitive articles (perhaps one that 
could read “Acts Against the Laws and Customs of War”), it remains difficult to describe 
the military justice system as one focused on, or even defined by, the prosecution of war 
crimes.  The primary exception in the UCMJ, discussed above, turns on trials governed 
by the “law of war,” an option rarely invoked by military courts.   
¶50 In 2005, U.S. Air Force Major Mynda L.G. Ohman, Staff Judge Advocate at RAF 
Croughton, United Kingdom, wrote an excellent article in the Air Force Law Review 
about Titles 10 and 18 of the U.S. Code. She summarized how antiquated the UCMJ has 
become in the context of war crimes prosecutions: 
Violations of a federal criminal statue, such as the War Crimes Act, may be 
tried before courts-martial. Article 134 of the UCMJ, the "general article," 
allows the military to import non-capital federal criminal statutes and charge 
them in a military court-martial. This broadens the subject matter of criminal 
offenses available to military courts. Not only are the punitive articles of the 
UCMJ available to the military prosecutor, any federal criminal statute that 
applies where the crime was committed could also be charged under the 
general article. For example, this provision would generally allow military 
authorities to incorporate the War Crimes Act into military prosecutions and 
charge U.S. service members with certain war crimes. 
While the UCMJ has the flexibility to import federal law into trials by courts-
martial, it has its limits. Courts have interpreted the language of the general 
article to bar importation of federal capital crimes into UCMJ proceedings. 
Where federal civilian courts have jurisdiction over criminal offenses that 
authorize the death penalty, these same Title 18 crimes may not be brought 
                                                 
69 Military Commissions Act § 948d(a). 
70 Id. at § 950(v). 
71 10 U.S.C. § 32 (2006). 
72 10 U.S.C. §§ 77-134 (2006). 
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before a court-martial under Article 134. Turning again to the War Crimes 
Act, for the most serious war crimes—those in which the victim dies as a 
result of the accused's conduct—the statute authorizes the death penalty. Such 
crimes cannot be charged as war crimes in a trial by court-martial, and 
military prosecutors must charge the underlying conduct as a violation of 
another punitive article. 
The reliance on Title 10 to prosecute war crimes creates an anomaly. The 
Department of Defense (DoD) is normally the agency that prosecutes 
members of the U.S. armed forces. Federal criminal law allows for 
punishment of certain war crimes, yet the application of Title 18 war crimes 
is severely restricted in military courts-martial. The effect of this limitation is 
that courts-martial must continue to largely rely on the offenses defined by 
Title 10, instead of Title 18, when charging crimes that occur during an armed 
conflict.  As a result, the most egregious crimes under the laws of war 
committed by U.S. military members are charged as often less severe 
common crimes under the UCMJ. For example, the intentional, fatal shooting 
of a person protected by the Geneva Conventions will likely be charged as 
murder under Article 118, and torture will likely be charged as an aggravated 
assault under Article 128. Compared to Title 18 crimes, war-related offenses 
tried by courts-martial will often carry lower maximum penalties.73   
¶51 Among the various options for how to modernize the UCMJ, Major Ohman 
proposed “adding a new war crimes article to the UCMJ to: 1) align the UCMJ with 
existing federal criminal law; 2) better insulate U.S. military members from the use of 
military commissions; and 3) enjoy the preventive benefit of having a separate article that 
specifically defines and punishes war-related crimes.”74  If such a new war crimes article, 
with particularity, were incorporated in the UCMJ, it would enable the U.S. government 
to confirm the war crimes which now exist under customary and codified international 
law.  The new UCMJ article also should mirror those war crimes fully listed and 
incorporated into Title 18 as a matter of federal criminal law.  The new UCMJ article 
should incorporate a comprehensive listing of crimes against humanity in the event Title 
18 were to be amended to include such crimes, as the Crimes Against Humanity Act of 
2009 seeks to accomplish. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
¶52 The federal criminal code and military code exhibit significant gaps in their 
respective coverage of atrocity crimes, particularly crimes against humanity and war 
crimes—categories of crimes that have evolved rapidly in international criminal law and 
human rights law during the last seventeen years.  Other major nations—America’s 
allies—have modernized their codes to enable their courts to prosecute the full range of 
atrocity crimes, thus reflecting their democratic choice to strengthen the rule of law in 
                                                 
73 Mynda L.G. Ohman, Integrating Title 18 War Crimes into Title 10: A Proposal to Amend the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice, 57 A.F.L. REV. 1, 3-6 (2005). 
74 Id. at 6. 
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their own societies.  Such modernizing exercises also reflect their pragmatic choice to 
minimize the exposure of the nationals of such nations to the scrutiny of international 
criminal tribunals, because national courts will be able to shoulder that responsibility. 
¶53 Progress has been made to modernize the federal criminal code through the 
enactment of the Genocide Accountability Act, the Child Soldiers Accountability Act, and 
the Trafficking in Persons Accountability Act.   There remains a need to amend Title 18 
of the U.S. Code so that the full range of crimes against humanity and war crimes can be 
prosecuted in federal courts without any question as to the ability of such courts to 
exercise complete subject matter jurisdiction over such international crimes.  The Crimes 
Against Humanity Act of 2009 would advance that objective considerably.  Amendments 
to Title 10 of the U.S. Code would enable military courts to fully prosecute war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.    
¶54 The jurisdiction of federal criminal courts should extend to all U.S. nationals who 
perpetrate atrocity crimes anywhere in the world and to any alien who commits an 
atrocity crime in the United States or anywhere else in the world and, in the latter 
situation, who also is present on U.S. territory.  None of the atrocity crimes should be 
shielded behind any statute of limitations.  It is fortunate that the Genocide 
Accountability Act honors that principle and that the Crimes Against Humanity Act of 
2009 would, if enacted, also be free of any statute of limitations. 
¶55 Filling the gaps in American law pertaining to atrocity crimes would demonstrate 
that the United States has the confidence to reject impunity for such crimes and to hold its 
own nationals, as well as foreign nationals over whom U.S. courts should be exercising 
personal jurisdiction, to account.  The United States would no longer be a safe haven in 
reality for untold numbers of perpetrators of atrocity crimes.  The process of amending 
Title 18 already has begun and should be continued.  Title 10 awaits further examination 
by appropriate committees of the Congress.  The United States should achieve equal 
footing with many of its allies that already have recast their criminal law to reflect the 
reality of international criminal and humanitarian law in our own time.   
